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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES C. KNIGHT and BEATRICE· M.
KNIGHT,
Plaintiffs and Respondents

vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
corporation and OGDEN RIVER WATE·R
USERS ASSOCIATION, a corporation,
Defendants and .A.p·p·ellants.

RESPONDENTS' SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT

OF FACTS
As we believe appellants' statement is insuffcient
to a proper understanding of this case we are under the
necessity of supplementing it. Here, as in appellants'
brief, the respondents and appellants will be respectively
designated plaintiffs and defendants.
The pipe line here involved was constructed pursuant to a three party contract (plaintiffs' Exhibit B,
T. 131) bet,veen the defendants and the United States
of America. The contract provides that the new pipe
be c.onstructed on the Povver Company's R. 0. W. and
"to the alignment and gTades of the Company's p-resent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pipe line,'' and that ''in general, the new wood stave
pipe line, where plaeed on the original located line, will
be buried in the same manner as the present pipe line
of the Company." (Exhibit B, paragraph 5, and contract ''Exhibit B'' thereto attached.) All plans were
subject to the approval of the Power Company. (Ibid.)
and work was to be done to its satisfaction. Defendants,
under the contract, operated and maintained the new
line jointly .. (Ibid., paragraph 17.)
Experience over the past thirty-five years (as far
back as the recollection of any witness goes) is that frequently in Ogden Canyon, especially at the time of
the spring thaws, rocks and boulders on the sides of
Ogden Canyon are loosened by the forces of nature and
particularly by the action of moisture freezing and
melting in rotation, and roll down the canyon side
across the pipe line situs to the bottom of the canyon.
These vary in size from small pebbles to great boulders
of many tons mass. (Tr. 19, 20, 22, 23, 26-29; 31-36, 37.)
Plaintiffs produced evidence that this pipe and also
the one it replaced had been broken in this vicinity
by rolling rocks on several previous occasions and at·
least onee before at substantially the same spot.
(Tr. 22, 23; 26-29; 35, 36.) On one such occasion the
resulting flood flowed down the road 'more than a
thousand feet. (Tr. 39).
Moreover, a parallel pipe line maintained by Ogden
City for many years was subject to frequent breaks in
the exposed portions from rocks rolling down the canyon side. ( Tr. 31-36.) In 1933, three years before
Defendant's new pipe was built, the city's old surface
pipe was replaced with a new 38" pipe which was buried
2
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from one or t'vo feet below the surface of the ground.
Thereafter, although roeks still rolled across this pipe,
no further trouble with such breakage has been experienced. (Tr. 44--±o, 48.)
The engineer 'vho planned the Defendants' new
pipe g·a ve consideration to these dru1gers, but the use of
available safety precautions, such as burying the pipe
or using· steel pipe, 'vas limited because of the increased
cost to defendants of such precautions. (Tr. 147, 148.)
On the night of the break and the resulting flood
1\Ir. -J. W. Farrell, 'vho drove up the canyon between
6 :30 and 7 :00 p.m., was the first to see the trouble.
(Tr. 158-9.) He met the water about 1,000 feet below
the break, drove straig·ht through (against the current)
and without stopping proceeded to the~ dam to get the
·water turned off. He does not mention seeing the rock
8~ feet long and 5 feet high which other witnesses who
arrived later saw in the middle of the road. (Tr. 180,
183, 184, 230.) Neither does he mention meeting Mr.
Edward Jesperson, who, driving down th canyon (with
the current) was stalled at the upper edge of the flood
in water 1¥2 feet deep at first, but which rose over the
cushions of his car before the water was stopped. He
was stalled only 30 or 40 feet west of the C.anyon Grocery. (Tr. 24.) The break apparently caused by the
large boulder which came to rest in the road was 300 or
400 feet uJest of the Grocery. ( Tr. 219) About 100,
150, or 200 feet east of this break, where the pipe was
not covered at all, two other smaller rocks had hit the
north side of the pipeline and were found beside it.
Defendants' employees testified that they ''had broken
a little hole'' ( Tr. 182; 237) from. which (on the following morning) no ~ater was flowing. (Tr. 182~)
3
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Two days after the flood Mr. Henry G. Allred and
a companion traced its course up to that hole by the
debris and other marks left by the water as it flowed
down the canyon to Plaintiffs' house. They found a
hole 3 or 4 feet long and 2 feet wide, with evidence of
extensive water flow, and two boulders, each about
2x2x3 feet in size lying beneath the break. ( Tr. 60-63)
(It is Plaintiffs' eontention that this break came first
and caused the damage and that the break emphasized
by defendants came some time later.) He found two
tracks, apparently of the course of the boulders, running
down the mountainsidH to the place of this -break. (Tr.
64, 65.) At this point the pipe is low, but west of there
(down-canyon) it raises to go over a hump, so that
this point would be under pressure.
At the timH there was some sno\v banked on either
side of the road by the snowplows of the State Road
Commission, but not so much as shown by defendants'
photog~raphic exhibits taken the following year. (Tr. 7374.) However, this was the normal condition of the
road in winter; it was common knowledge, and Defendants knew that this road was ploughed out every winter.
(Tr. 245-246.)
According to the contract Exhibit B (second page
of ''Exhibit B '' attached thereto) the designed capacity
of the pipeline is at least 320 c.f.s.; although Mr. Jones,
the Power Company's superintendent, said it was 280
c.f.s. (Tr. 255.) At the time of the break it was carrying
about one-ha.lf its capacity. (Tr. 255.)
Plaintiffs' complaint as amended alleges negligence
( 1) in eonstructing such a pipe on the surface of the
ground unprotected from the known dangers of rolling
4
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rocks and (2) in flowing large quantities of water
through the pipe so unprotected. (R. 002-003.)· Although
negligence in maintenance was also alleged, the court
submitted the case to the jury only on the questions of
negligent construction and operation.

It should be noted that defendants' quotation (on
page 15 of their brief) of the court's _Instruction 9 is
erroneous: the words ''and maintenance'' are not contained in the instruction. (R. 062; Tr. 286.)

THE ARGUMENT
This case was presented by the respondent-plaintiffs
and tried by the lower court upon general principles of
negligence under which human beings are bound, in the
conduct of their affairs, to use reasonable care to avoid
injury from dangers which a reasonably prudent man
would have forseen. The trial court submitted the case
to the jury on instructions based on the decisions of this
court carefully defining the duties and standards of care
required of defendants in accordance with these general
principles. By its verdict the jury in effect found that
a reasonable prudent man would, under all the circumstances, have foreseen _the danger which in fact materrialized, and that defendants failed to take reasonable
precautions to avoid damage to the plaintiffs resulting
therefrom, and further, that the damage resulted naturally and proximately from that failure. As there is
ample evidence in support of every fact necessary to
the verdict, and the case is one at law, the verdict should
not be disturbed. We will, however, answer in order
the four points raised in the Appellants' brief:
5
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1. The lower court did not err in overruling defendants' demurrers, irn denying defenda.nts' motions jo1
non·suit following plaintiffs' opening statement, or in
denying defendants' motions for non-suit following com·
pletion of plaintiffs' case in chief.

The, defendants, itl the first section of their brief,
attack the sufficiency of the alleged and proved facts to
spell out negligence.
However, it is alleged that defendants were negligent (1) in so constructing the pipe upon the surface
that it was exposed to rolling rocks which every spring
roll down the canyon side without protection from such
rocks, and (2) in c.oursing large quantities of water
through the pipe when it was so unprotected. It is also
alleged· that the defendants knew, or by the exercise of
reasonable care should hav known of such rolling rocks.
These allegations of course state in general terms the
factual basis of legal negligence unless this court is
going to hold that power and irrigation companies are

entitled as a matt~:J1}~r.~c9?!~.!~!:!Ieams of0

water~~~~~~
normal forces of nature which are likely to cause the
water to escape from its confining· pipe with disastrous
results. We submit that is not the law, and we are
confident the court will not so hold. Defendants are
bound so to use their property that their neighbors will
not be injured as a result of defendants' failure reason·
ably to provide against forseeable hazards.
The evidence, although not entirely without conflict,
amply supports the allegations. Certainly the escape
of the water from the exposed pipe, with resulting damage, was forseeable by anyone, especially in the light
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of past experieuee. There "·as evidence that this pipe
had been previou8ly (and since 1936) broken ( T. 23) and
that the pipe \Yhich preceded it, and which was owned
and operated by the defendant Power Company, bad
been broken at about the same spot, all by rolling rocks.
(T. 26-29). 1loreover, the evidence showed without conflict that Ogden ('1ity 's parallel pipe-line had frequently
suffered similar breaks from the same cause, until, some
years prior to the construction of the defendants' pipe,
the city's pipe was buried from one to two feet, since
when no farther breaks have occurred. A reasonably
prudent man, we submit, would have profited by the
city's experience, and protected his neighbors against
the hazard of a tremendous flow of water on the side
of a steep canyon when he knew that rolling rocks had
already broken similar pipelines on many occasions.
Such dangers \vere in fact foreseen, but were ignored
to save money. (Tr. 147-148). Surely it is not unreason~
able to require the defendants here to meet, in their
pursuit of businss profit, the same standard of care as
Ogden City. found it necessary and convenient to 'meet.
To permit defendants so to save money and profits at
plaintiffs' expense, would, we submit, amount to a taking
of plaintiffs' property without due process of law and
without fair compensation in violation of the Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section
1, and the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7
and Section 22. To kno,vingly expose plaintiffs' property to so obvious and great a hazard as that here
existing· certainly depreciates its value immediately, and
sooner or later results in its damage and partial destruction. If defendants wanted, for reasons of economy, to
7
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impose this risk on plaintiffs' land without liability,
they should have condemned it, so that they could flood
it with impunity after paying the value of the land.
We think it fair to point out that in comparing the
situation of the defendants and Ogden City the standard
of care and the efforts reasonably to be required of defendants to avoid injury to their neighbors was even
higher than that reasonably to be required of the city.
The degree of care required is, generally speaking,
graduated according to the danger attendant upon the
acts performed or instrumentality used, and the greater
the danger the greater the care and vigilance required
to avoid injury.
38 Am. J ur. 677, ''Negligence,'' Section 31;
Mackay vs. Breeze,
72 Utah 305, 269 Pac. 1026, 1027.
In this ease the capacity of defendants' pipe line was
approximately four times that of the city's pipe; the
potential flood was four times as great. Hence the degree of care required of defendants would be substantially greater than that required of the city. It would
he reasonable to require defendants to assume a much
larger financial burden in the interest of safety.
It would seem clear that under all the circumstances
it was negligence for defendants to course 140 c.f.s. of
water through the unprotected pipe, at least during the
season when rolling rocks were to be expected, and the
submission of the case to the jury was fully justified.
Such rocks were to be anticipated in the ordinary course
of nature, and when defendants undertook to run a
tremendous flow of water down the canyonside for their
8
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purposes, they \Yere under a duty to construct and
operatP the means of accomplishing their purpose in
a \Yay \Yhich \Yould adequately meet and cope with such
ua tural emergencies.
O\Yll

Jordan
15

l~tah

,~.

Uity of 1\lt. Pleasant
-±49, 49 Pac. 746

Li~ollbee Y .

.Jionroe Irrig·ation Co.
18 Utah 343, 54 Pac. 1009.

In- the latter ca8e thi8 court carefully and clearly outlined the la''T of Utah applicable to such situations, and
the trial court here followed that law.
Defendants rely upon the case of Logan, Hyde Park
and Smithfield Canal Co., v. Utah Power and Light Co.,
45 Utah 491, 146 Pac. 560. It is true that the situation
there was much like the situation here, and that it was
held that there \vas no liability there. However there
are material and vital differences in the facts there and
here which make that case inapplicable to the case at
bar. We shall consider them briefly.
First, then, in the case cited the rock in question
was proved to have been started down the mountain by
a human agency, by ''some person or persons who were
strangers to the defendant' '-clearly a negligent act.
Here it is conceded that the rocks involved were started
by the usual and normal forces of nature. "It can be
stated as a general rule that ordinarily the intervention
of a neglige,ut act as the indepedent and efficient cause
of an injury operates to relieve one who has been guilty
of prior negligence from responsibility for the injury,
nof.withsta11ding the condition under which the irn,.tert'eni ug cause operated was created by the prior negligence.'' (Italic~ added.)
9
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38 Am. J ur. 729, ''Negligence'' § 72.
Thus the defendant in the cited case was not bound to
forsee that a human being would break its flume by
negligently rolling a rock upon it. In this case, however, the defendants under all the circumstances were
bound to foresee that rocks loosened by the forces of
nature would be likely to strike and break their unprotected pipe. It had happened repeatedly before. ''The
view that wher a natural fore or act of God unites with
human negligence in causing injury the negligence of
the human agent is regarded as a condition, and not as
a cause of the injury, is disapproved generally. The general rule is that when the negligence of a. responsible
pe.rson concurs with an ordinary flood, storm, or other
natural force, or with a co-called :ac.t of God, in producing an injury, the party guilty of such negligence
will be held liable for the injurious consequences, if the
injury would not have happened except for his failure
to exercise care. '' (Italics added.)
38 Am. Jur. 719, et seq., "Negligence"§ 65.
Secondly, in the Canal Company case cited by defendants there was no evidence that rolling rocks had
ever before broken the pipe or flume there involved. In
this case the evidence 'vas that this pipe and its predecessor and a parrallel pipe had been repeatedly broken
by rolling rocks, but that the parallel pipe suffered no
further damage from rocks after it was buried. The
background of experience in Ogden Canyon, the circumstanees against which the forseeability of injury
must be tested in determining negligence, is in this case
exactly the opposite of that in the cited case. Here
there was even evidence of a previous break at this par-
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tic-l,tlar po,i·nt. Has this no bearing 9n forseeability?
The opinion in tht• previous case \Yas based in large part
upon considern tion of the fact that no previous difficulty had been experienced. The proving of the contrary fact here is sufficient alone to distinguish the
cases on their facts.
Thirdly, Og·den Canyon is heavily populated, with
almost all available level space occupied by human habitations, ""bile Logan Canyon in 1913 and earlier had
practieally no population especially in the early spring
when rocks most frequently roll down the canyon sides.
That being the fact, the degree care required in constructing and operating a pipeline of tremendous capacity do\Yn the side of Ogden Canyon is much higher,
under the doctrine stated in Makay v. Breeze, supra,
because the danger of injury to property and even of the
destruction of human life to be anticipated in the latter
case is much greater. One may reasonably take chances
in a desert that would be unreasonable in a croweded
city. Hence it is quite reasonable to require defendants
to protect their pipe in Ogden Canyon, even if it be
co1iceded that it would have been unreasonable to make
a similar requirement for the Logan Canyon flume ~a
generation ago. For this additional reason the case
relied on by defendants is not applicable.
In view of the fact that the defendants here cite
45 C. J. 746 (736°?) to the effect that an injury resulting
directly and proximately from an act of God is not
recoverable, it will perhaps be helpful to the Court to
quote from the same authority, at the same page, the
text writer's definition of an Act of God:
11
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''The term 'Act of God' is used to designate the
cause of an injury ... where such injury is due
directly and exclusively to natural causes without hu.man intervention, and could not have been
prevented by the exercise of human care or foresight, and for an injury so c.aused no one is
liable . . . In order that this rule may apply
the act of God must be the sole cause of an injury, for if an act of God and the negligence of
an individual are concurring causes of an injury,
the individual who was guilty of negligence is
liable for the injury."
Even if we were to concede that the rolling rocks
which released the flood in this case were acts of God
(which we do not) still they would not have caused
lVfr. and Mrs. Knight any damag-e had it not been for
the defendants' negligence in conducting a tremendous
volume of water along the hillside in an unprotected
pipe when they knew from experience of the danger of
breakage from rolling rocks. Their negligence necessarily concurred, and they are liable.
Before we end our consideration of the first section
of defendants' brief we want to devote a moment to ·an
analysis of the case of
Howe v. West Seattle L. & I. Co.,
59 Pac. 495 (Washington),
which was distinguished by this court in its opinion in
the Canal Company case cited by defendants. It is,
we submit, indistinguishable from the case at bar. There
defendants had placed a log on a hillside. Here the
defendants placed a large quantity of water on a hillside.
There the defendants failed adequately to protect the
log from being dislodged or released to roll down the
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slope. Here the defendants failed adequately to protect
their 'Yater from being released to flow down the slope.
There landslides had in the past come down the hillside. Here rocks had in the past rolled down the hillside-even releasing water on previous occasions. There
another landslide dislodged the log·, which proceeded
down the hill, causing injury. Here another rolling rock
released the "'"ater, which proceed down . the slope,
causing· injury. There it 'vas held proper to submit the
case to the jury. Here also the trial court properly submitted the case to the jury.
Under the facts proved it was p-roperly a que~stion
for the jury to determine whether a reasonable prudent
man would have forseen and guarded against the danger
of water being released by rolling rocks. In the light
of the experience in Ogden Canyon, where rocks break
exposed pipes frequently, ac.cording to the testimony
of the City Waterworks Department, and especially as
there was evidence that a pipe had been so broken
previous at this p.aint, the defendants' negligence was
properly submitted to the jury.
2. The lower court did not ·err in denying defendants motion for a directed verdJ~ct or in refusitng defendants' requested instruction Number One, w·hiah
would have instructed the jury to find for the defendants.

In answering the second section of defendants' brief
little need be added to what has already been said about
the basic negligence of defendants in conducting large
quantities of water upon the hillside of a steep canyon
without taking reasonable precautions to see that it
stayed within its conduit. The question was for the
jury, and its verdict cannot properly be upset. The

13
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defendants' evidence only showed that on the same
night a second and larger rock hounded into the pipe
at a point some 150 or 200 feet west of the break mentioned in the testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses, causing
a second break at a point where the pipe was going over
a hill, and where it was lightly covered with soil and
to some extent protected by the brow of a cut in which
the pipe had been laid to keep -the grade over the hill
lower. Defendants devote much argument to the proposition that they could not have forseen this break.
Although we disagree, in view of the commonly known
tendency of rolling rocks to bounce as they roll, we think
this is immaterial.
It seems clear from the evidence that the water
which caused the damage in this case was released by
the tvv-o rocks found by the witness Allred (T. 60-63)
which were in a low uncovered, unprotected section of
the pipe, and farther up-canyon. This hole was about
two by three or four feet in size (T. 61), and because
it was in a low spot the water at this point would be
under greater pressure and would flow faster. The witness Farrell, who first saw the flood, drove through it
and apparently never saw the great boulder which
caused the break to which defendants' witnesses devoted
their attention, although that boulder came to rest in
the middle of the road, and was of such size as to be
inescapable. The irresistable conclusion is that the
brea.,k found by Allred, where the pipe was totally unprotected came first, and c.aused the damage, and that
the boulder so cherished by defendants came sometime
after Farrell drove through. This conclusion is bolstered
by the evidence of the witness Jesperson, who found
water at the extreme upper edge of the flood, and only

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30 or 40 feet \vest of the grocery store, high enough
to stall him and cun1e up to the cushions of his car. He
apparently sa\Y no rock in the road, although he saw
enoug·h \Yater at this point to cause all the damage.
\"'\:e submit that there 'Yas evidenee from which the
jury would be justified in finding that the damage resulted from tbe break caused by the smaller rocks described by Allred, and \Yhich he found by tracing the
flood to its source by the mud and debris left. That
being the case it is idle to speculate here or to argue that
the preponderance of evidence is the other way. This
is a law case, and the facts are for the jury, which has
found for the plaintiffs on competent evidence. There
is ample evidence to show that the pipe was negligently
constructed, operated and maintained at the point of this
break. We submit that even the other break presented a
jury question in the light of past experience with this
slope.
Defendants cite and rely on the case of
Ward v. Salt Lake City
46 Utah 616, 151 Pac. 905,
to the effect that in the construction of public works
a city's duty is discharged if it merely employs a competent engineer to draw plans and then follows the plans.
That rule is closely related to and apparently influenced
by the rule of the immunity of the sovereigin. It is
akin to the "public policy" theory under which charitable corporations are liable for the torts of their servants
only if they are negligent in choosing and employing the
servant. 10 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, §§4923
and 4927. So far as we know the rule has never been
extended, and we submit it should not be extended to
situations such as this.
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For here we do not have a municipal arm of the
sovereign, a city government of, by, and for the people.
Nor do we have a charitable corporation dispensing
quasi-public charity without private profit. Here we
have groups of men organized into corporations for
private profit-for their own financial gain. To apply
the doctrine of the Ward case here would be to let down
the bars completely. The defendant Power Company
could plead with quite equal logic that it was not responsible for the reckless driving of one of its truck
drivers, because, forsooth, he had passed a driving test
and submitted a chauffer's license before he was
employed.
Actually the Utah rule that a city is liable for
failure to exercise due care in selecting an employee to
-draft plans for a public improvement is a departure
from the general ru1e that the adoption of plans is a
governmental function in the performance of- which the
city has the sovereign's immunity from tort liability.
See
38 Am. Jur. 328 and 336, "Municipal Corporations'' § § 628 and 634.
It can have no application to the negligence of private
corporations for profit.
Defendants argue, however, that in fact the sovereign United States of America planned and built the
pipe in-· this case and, -as the rule would apply to the
United States, that defendants can he liable only if
the United States would he liable, as (it is claimed) they
came into the picture '' o~nly after the pro.iect was completed." (Italics ours). Perhaps the most obvious thing
wrong with this argument is that the facts are not as
stated by defendants. 'The gov~rnment constructed
16
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the pipeline pur~n1aut to and in accordance with a preexisting contract ''"ith the defendants specifying that
the line should bt' buried only in the same manner as
the Power Company's previous line (which had been
broken by rocks) and under which the plans were sub·
ject to the approral of the Power Company. See our
statement of facts, page 1, supra. Thus defendants' contract, for which they were responsible, required the
government to construct the pipe in a way that defendants kne'v was dang-erous. It is true that a government
engineer drew the plans which were incorporated in the
contract, but this "~ould not relieve the defendant corporations of their duty to use due care in approving the
plans. The government certainly would not have proceeded without the approval and cooperation of the
defendants and their execution of the contract. The
defendants had practical control, and as private corporation sthey are responsible for their negligent exercise thereof.
~Ioreover, it is apparent that the engineer working
on the plans was not left free to plan a safe conduit
according- to his knowledge and experience, but was
compelled to compromise safety factors with financial
factors in order to gain the cooperation of defendants
in the project. (T. 147-148.) It was decided that, in
the interest of economy for defendants, the plaintiffs
should be exposed to a risk of a _flood let loose by rolling
stones \vhich should have been anticipated. Surely under
these circumstances defendants should not be permitted
to hide behind the skirts of the sovereign! If, to save
themsPlves money, they knowingly exposed plaintiffs to
danger of injury, they are responsible for that injury.
They took the risk for plaintiffs, and now should take
the consequences.
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Moreover, defendants' argument overlooks the fact
that when the pipe was turned over to them the defect
and danger was apparent, and it was negligent of them
to fill the pipe with water without first correcting the
dangerous defect. Even if it were conceded, for the
argument's sake, that they were not responsible for the
manner in which the pipe was constructed, still, having
knowledge of that danger (which the engineer perhaps
did not) they coursed a tremendous stream of water
through the pipe without first taking precautions to see
that it would not escape through the intervention of
natural forces, and it was proper to submit the case
to the jury. This is the rule even with respect to
sovereign municipalities. ''As soon as the fault or
injurious consequences are known, or ought to be known
to the municipality, it is duty bound to remedy the defect,
if this can be done, or, if not, to cease the operation of
the pubZic agency until the defect is remedied; the penalty
of refusal after reasonable notice will be liability in
damages for the injuries caused by the defect.'' (Italics
added.)
38 Am. Jur. 329, "Municipal Corporations,"
§ 628, nt. 8.

See also
Morris v. Salt Lake City
35 Utah 474, 101 Pac. 373, syllabus 9.
It was there held that the ·city was liable for failure
to remove trees left standing after their roots were cut
by an independent sidewalk contractor, even if the
cutting was a necessary incident to a proper plan for the
sidewalk, where the city had kno"rledge of the danger
created by the contractor's act and failed to corr.ect it
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before the \Yind (a natural force, as here) blew the trees
over. \V. e think this rase is exactly in point on the
question of defendants' operational negligence. The
eYidence is that this pipe "~as broken once before, and
still defendants took no steps to remedy the patent defect.
Defendants further argue that plaintiffs assumed
the risk of injury by building· or buying a home under the
pipeline after the pipe was constructed. This is of
course tantamount to an assertion that by negligently
building· their pipe the defendants acquired the right to
forbid or prevent the normal and usual use of all land
belo"~ the pipeline. That of course is not the law. If
defendants wanted to take the land for use as a reservoir
for flood waters released by their pipe when it should
break, they should have condemned it and paid its fair
value. The land was there for some hundreds of centuries before the pipe was built, nor did defendants show
that it was not in private ownership, with the incidental
right to normal use, before any pipe was laid in Ogden
Canyon. Defendants could not take away this right
either directly or indirectly without compensation.
The doctrine of assumed risk is applicable only
w·here the injured person might reasonably elect whether
to expose himself to th danger, and if he could not reasonably escape he assumes no risk.
38 Am. J ur. 848, ''Negligence,''

§

173.

Here the property owner could not pick up his land with
the building on it and move it to a safer place. Building
plots are not ambulatory. He could only avoid risk of
injury by abandoning his property-which would itself
be an injury suffered if the abandonment were forced by
defendants' negligence. Plaintiffs were not reasonably
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free to elect whether or not to expose themselves to the
risk, especially in view of the well known housing
shortage.
Nor is a property owner bound to foreg·o the improvement of his land because the preexisting negligence
of another makes it probable that the land and improvements will be flooded and damaged.
North Bend Lumber Company v. Seattle (Wash.)
199 Pac. 988, 19 A.L.R. 415, 419;
Annotation: 19 A.L.R. 423.
Defendants urge also that they used reasonable care
under the circumstances, and the fact that they did not
use greater care will not render them liable The question was submitted to the jury under proper instructions
to determine whether defendants exercised the care
a reasonably prudent man would have exercised under
the circumstances. The ju,ry, by its verdict, has found
that defendants did not act with ordinary caution. The
evidence described in considerable detail the history of
the breakage of exposed water pipes in Ogden Canyon,
and the experience of Ogden City before and after it
buried its parallel pipe. It was for the jury to say
whether defendants used reasonable care under the
circumstanees.
Defendants also seem to intimate-that the rock here
was so large that no precaution could have avoided the
break-that the rock was, in effect, a vis major. But we
have already pointed out that there was evidence that
the damage in fact came from two very ordinary rocks.
The court instructed the jury that defendants were not
required to prepare to meet unlooked for and over20
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"?helming· di~plays of adverse power of such nature· as
to surprise eautiou~ and reasonable men. (R. 062) Apparently the jury \Yas of the opinion either that the
smaller rocks did the damage, or that reasonable men
'vould not have been surprised or overwhelmed by the
large one, and that reasonable protection of the pipe
'vould have averted the break. In any event, it was a
question for the jury. We have already referred to the
principle that negligence concurring with an act of God
to produce injury is actionable.
We submit the court did not err in denying defendants' motion for a directed verdict and refusing their
requested instruction number one.

3. The lotver court did not err in refusing defendants' requested instructions Nos. 9 and 14.
(a) Defendants' request No. 9 which would have
charged that defendants were not required to anticipate
that a rock would be broken from a certain cliff ''and
therefore plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover'' is
clearly improper, and was properly refused. Whether
an ordinary prudent man would forsee the severance
of the rock would in any event be for the jury. Moreover, the question of the breaking of the rock from any
particular cliff is utterly irrelevant. The question really
involved was whether a reasonbaly prudent man would
have foreseen the danger from rolling or bounding rocks
from whatever source on the hillside above. In view
of previous experience in evidence it seems clear that
such a man would have anticipated that rocks would
roll over and into an exposed pipe. Such rocks were
common experience. To say that a man is not negligent
because he could not in advance place his finger upon the
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particular rock destined to break the pipe is obviously
wrong. The forseeability of the terminus, not the source
of rolling rocks on this mountainside, was the point in
issue. Moreover, the distance to the cliff is immaterial,
so long as the slope from the cliff to the pipe· is uninterrupted, as it is. Defendants are not ·entitled to assume
that a rock, once started rolling, would just become
tired and stop after so many hundred feet. Moving
rocks rarely stop on a slope.
(b) Defendants' Requested instruction No. 14 deals
with proximate cause. It would have instructed in effect,
that ,if the flood waters released from defendants' pipe
would have missed plaintiffs' home "hut for" the plowing of the snow from the state highway so as to make a
channel of the road, plaintiffs can't recover. In their
argument on this point defendants say, "·Under norrnal
conditions it [the water] would have flowed from the
highway and into the river long before it reached plaintiffs' property." (Italics added.) That statement is
entirely without support in the evidence. On the contrary, all the evidence was that the situation at the time
of the accident was entirely normal. The evidence without any conflict was that the winter snows were always
plowed out of the road in the same manner. This was
well known. As defendants' superintendent in charge of
the pipeline testified, that was done every year, and
was a condition known to everyone; it exists on all canyon roads. (T. 245-246.) That this is normal is further
shown by defendants' own photographic exhibits, taken
the following February, and showing a similar, but even
more extreme, channel. In other words, this channel,
which defendants would have the court regard as an
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interYeniug eausP. \ras part of the normal topography
of thl• area every year during· the season of rolling rocks.
Defendants \Yere not entitled to assume that it would be
other·w·ise, or thnt it \vould not carry escaping waters
down the roa.dvfay from a break at this or any other
point above the road.
Defendants' argument is thus seen to rest upon a
false assumption of fact: namely, that the "normal"
condition of the road '"'as freedom from snow which had
been plo\Yed into banks. Quite the contrary \Vas true
under all the evidence, and the arg·ument falls with the
false assumption on which it was based. There was
nothing in the evidence on which to base the giving of
the requested instruction, and it was properly refused.
~Ioreover,

the intervention of independent intervening causes \Yill not break the casual connection if the
intervention of such forces was itself probable or
forseea ble.
38 Am. Jur. 727, "Negligence"
§70, nt. 4

Here the practice of plowing of the road and its probably result were vvelr known to defendants. The defendant Power Company's pipe had previously broken
and the \vater had flo\ved down the road for 1,000 feet.
(T. 38-39.) And even if the plowed-out road had been
an abnormal rather than a normal winter and early
spring condition, still the requested instruction would
have been improper because it ignores the question as to
whether such condition was forseeable. It states without
qualification that if the ""ater was channelled to plaintiffs' property by the plowed road, the verdict must be
for defendants. That is not the law, as we have pointed
23
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out. Hence the request, as framed, was properly refused even if there had been (as there was not) evidence
on which a proper instruction on this detail of probable
cause might have been based.
In effect the annual plowing of the road was not
an intervening cause, but a pre-existing topographical
condition, of which defendants had knowledge, and which
merely set the stage for defendants' negligence, as did
the steep, rocky mountainside. But even if the plowing
each year should he deemed a new act, unrelated to the
pre-existence of the highway and the annual sno,vs,
still it was a lawful and proper act for the highway
officials to do, and being without fault, it would not be,
1n law, an efficient intervening proximate cause.
38 Am. J ur. 732, "Negligence,"

§

73, nt. 4.

Nor can the plowing of the road he logically classed
as an efficient intervening cause. It could not have
flooded the Knight home; it_ produced no water. At
most it would be a concurring cause. And the rule that
where the negligence of two tort feasors concurs to produce an injury they are jointly and severally liable is
too well known to require citation of authority. However, see
45 C. J. 920.
See also
Coleman v. Bennett
69 s. w. 734, 735,
a case extraordinar~ly like the one at bar on this question
of proximate cause. There the defendant \vrongfully
danimed a stream. ~ubsequently a third party built a
levee along· the reservoir so formed. During a freshet
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the levee \Yashed out, and the debris therefrom, drifting
downstream on the released \Vaters, formed obstructions
\Yhich threw the \raters on plaintiff's lands. Without
the dam the \Vaters 'vould not have been thrown against
the third party's levee. Without the obstructions which
came from the levee the water would have flowed harmlessly down the -natural channel after leaving the dam.
It was held that the dam was a proximate cause of the
injury, uninterrupted by the construction of the third
party's levee, and the defendant was liable even though
no injury would have resulted without the concurring
act of the third party.
We submit that the defendants' request No. 14 was
properly refused. The quotation from
Rollow v. Og·den City
66 Utah 475, 243 Pac. 791,
in defendants' brief (pp. 39-40) is not applicable, for
the reason that there was no evidence of a ''new or independent" cause, but only, at most, of a normal condition whicvh was a ''concurring'' cause, of which defendants had full knowledge in advance.
4. The lower court did not err in its instructions
1, 5, 9, 10, or 12.

As to Instru.ction No. 1.
-Defendants complain of the court's instruction outlining the issues because it stated plaintiffs' allegation
that ' ' defendants carelessly and negligently left the
said pipe lying unprotected upon the surface of the
ground,'' contending that there was no evidence to go
to the jury on that _issue, as (so defendants say) the
evidence showed the pipe was protected by the brow
of a cut and by six inches of earth.
25
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In the first place, there was evidence that the pipe
was uncovered at the point of the easterly break which
caused the injury. The witness Allred testified that at
the point of the break and for several rods east the
pipe was completely bare, and lying on top of the ground.
(T. 62-64). That was not dispu.ted. And whether the.
brow of the cut at the point of the subsequent break referred to by defendants, and a mere six inches of dirt,
were "protection" was properly for the jury. There
was no error in outlining the allegation and the denial,
especially where, as here, the trial court's attention was
not timely invited to defendants' claim by a suitable
request for an instruction withdrawing that issue.
Defendants also complain of the sentence in which
the court states plaintiffs' allegation that defendants knew or should have known that every s-pring frost
loosened rocks roll down the mountainside and across
the location of the pipe. This seems highly technical,
and could not have confused the jury, especially in view
of the fact that the paragraph in question was initiated
with the words ''The plaintiffs in their complaint allege
... '', the immediately ensuing paragraph hegins ''Plaintiffs further allege . . . '', and the instruction concludes
''You are instructed that the foregoing allegations and
denials are not to be considered by you as statements
of fact . . . '' We should presume that jurors are of
ordinary intellig·ence, and clearly no ordinary intellect
cognizant of the ordinary uses of the English language
would be misled by the instruction. Moreover, the error,
if any, was harmless, for on the trial the servants and
agents of the defendants admitted the knowledge alleged.
The instruction might well be upheld as a proper
statement of the law, for it is the law that everyone
26·
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must take notice n t his peTil of such ordinary results
of the operation of physical laws as the effect of the
force of gra,Tity ou objects subject thereto, or the effect
of a tha"'T on a frozen mass on a slope.
38 Am. Jur. 712, "Negligence"§ 60.
We believe the defendants are bound in law to know
this phenomenon of springtime in the Rockies. However
it is not necessary to go so far to hold this assignment
of error is not well taken.
(b)

As to Instruction No. 5.

Surely there is no merit to this assignment of error.
Defendants complain that the court's general instruction
on proximate cause was not qualifiied hy the statement
that proximate c.ause must be operative '' w.ithout the
intervention of any new or independen.t carus-e.'' However the court did instruct that proximate cause is ''that
cause which, in a natural and eontinuous sequence,
unbroken by an eff'i~cient intervening cause, produces the
injury . . . " (Italics added.) The cour-t ·gave the
substance of what defendants contend for, and there is
no particular or peculiar virtue in the exact phraseology employed by defendants or by this court in the
Rollow case, supra.
Moreoer, asv we have heretofore pointed out, there
was here no evidence on 'vhich an instruction on intervening cause could properly be based. It follows that
any error which might have been eommitted in this regard was non-prejudicial.
The court's instruction, may we add by_ way of
post-script, is a stock instruction taken from a definition
having the most general approva~. See
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45 C. J. 898, note 15.
·(c)

As to Instruction No.9.

This instruction is taken almost verba tim from the
very carefully considered and worded statement of this
court in one of its leading cases, that of
Lisonbee v. Monr·oe Irrigation Company
18 Utah 343, 54 Pac. 1009.
We submit that it correctly states the law of this state
applicable to the facts of this case.
Defendants complain of the first paragraph as ''a
purely gratuitous theoretical observation ... which has
no plac.e in instructions of law." We submit that it
states a matter of c.omrnon knowledge of which the court
takes judicial notice, and which furnishes, a perfectly
proper introductory statement and background to assist
the, jury in a· proper understanding and application' of
the balance of that and other instructions. · There· is no
error here-and even if there .were it could not possibly
be prejudicial.
Defendants do not complain that the second paragraph of Instruc.tion No. 9 does not correctly state the
law applicable to this ease. Their complaint is only
that the court, having instructed (.No. 7, R. 061) that the
·jury could not find for the plaintiff unless it found the
pipeline was negligently constructed, now instructed further regarding negligent use. It is conceded, however,
that defendants were in fact using the pipe to conduct
large quantities of water along the mountainside, and
(as there wa·s ample evidenc.e) they were doing so after
more than adequate knowledge of the dangerous defect
and opportunity to correct it. The error, if any, was
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committed in g·iving instruction No. 7, and was prejudicial to plaintiffs, not defendants. As we have heretofore
pointed out, defendants, \vhether or not they were responsible for the negligent planning and construction of
the pipe, \vere in any event under a duty not to use the
pipe until they had remedied the defect. The danger,
of course, \vas apparent to all \Yho were not blinded to
it by the desire to keep down the cost of construction.
They had notice, but consciously discounted it to save
a dollar-at the expense of the Knights.
1'he court properly instructed the Jury as to the
use of the pipeline.
(d)

As to Instruction No. 10.

Here again defendants do not complain that the
instruction improperly states the law (see Mackay v.
Breeze, supra) but only that the instruction permits
consideration of their negligent use and operation thereof. This, as we have demonstrated in the immediately
preceding paragraphs hereof, was perfectly proper under
the pleadings and the evidence. In view of the construction of the line, any operation thereof for coursing
a large flow of water was negligent. There was no
error committed here.
(e)

As to Instruction No. 12.

As to subparagraphs (c) and (h) of Instruction 12,
the plaintiffs prayed for $375.00 damages by reason of
the destrnct,io·n of many items of clothing, and $50.00
for repairs to clothing which could be salvaged. There
"·as uncontroverted evidence introduced in support of
and clearly 1·elated to each claim separately. The court's
instructions obviously related to these two items, as was
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apparent to anyone who had heard the evidence. We
submit that there was· no error, but that if their was it
was prejudicial only to the plaintiffs.
As to subparagraphs (f) and ( j) of Instruction 12,
they obviously relate to two separate items of damage:
The former to the cost of repairs made to the furniture,
and the second to the damage ' ' beyond repair,'' that is,
the depreciation still existing after repairs, and which
repairs could not obvia.te. A ''repaired'' article is~
never worth as much as it was before it needed repair.
It is apparent that in the light of the issues and the
evidence, these instructions could not have misled the
jury, and no prejudicial error was committed.
While we are eonfident that the judgment below
shuold and will be affirmed, we are sensible that in every
law suit the confidence of counsel on one or the other
side in his case must in the end turn out to be _without
adequate foundation. Because we recognize the (remote, we believe) possibility that there /\viii be a re-trial
of this case, we venture to suggest that in such event
the guidance of this eourt on a matter of the admissibility of .some tendered evidence would he helpful to the
court below, and might avoid the necessity for a second
appeal.
At the trial below plaintiffs- offered to prove by the
witness Allred (the Attorney in fact for Mr. Knight, who
was overseas) that in a conversation about this accident
with Mr. R. R. Rowell, who was then ''Division Manager'' of defendant Power Company for the area embracing the territory in question, the Division Manager
told the witness, in sn bstance and effect, that Allred
should tell Mr. and Mrs-. Knight ''that the Company
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\rould see that thPy \Yere taken care of.'' ( T. 70, 71; 99.)
The offer \Yas refn8ed and the evidence excluded on defendant Po\ver Company's objection that there was no
~ho\Ying of authority to bind the company. We submit
that from the conferring of the title and duties of a
District ~Ianager, and in the absence of rebutting evidence, the authority is implied to make binding admissions of fault and liability for matters within the territory allotted to such a managing agent.
,Johnson Y. Yost Lumber Company
117 Fed. 2d 53, 59.
This case contains an excellent discussion of the policy
and principles involved. And if there is any evidence,
then the matter becomes a question for the jury under
proper instructions.
See
Goddard v. Lexington 1\IIotor Company
63 Utah161, 223 Pac. 340.
We trust, however, that the court will agree
no substantial error prejudicial to the defendants
committed by the learned judge below, and that it
affirm the judgment. We submit that under the
and the evidence it should do so.

that
was
will
law

Respectfully submitted,
THATCHER & YOUNG
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